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important, can stand the test of experience which requires them to vindicate their claims by continual approaches to a higher standard of reasonableness."

In short, Dr. Ladd, through a psychological analysis Socratic in its simplicity and thoroughness, proves the *unreality* of a besetting moral and intellectual difficulty—the difficulty that arises from the supposition that we must be ruled by reason *or* faith rather than by reason *and* faith. How hard and at the same time how rewarding it may be to be faithful to both—not, indeed, to serve two masters, but rather to live with one's whole self—he makes abundantly plain. No man is better skilled in finding the way to truth through the path of every man's thought and inner experience. Dealing with the real elements of consciousness, he arrives at conclusions sufficiently abstract to be clarifying—to be, indeed, practically final—without involving his readers in the dubiousness of metaphysical assumptions. It may be added perhaps without impertinence that it is refreshing to find in a work preëminently of philosophy or psychology, an apt quotation from a poet so far outside the purview of the narrow specialist as is Ernest Dowson.

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WAR AND THE IDEAL OF PEACE. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. New York: Duffield & Co., 1915.

An instance of the way in which modern thought strives to work itself free from the bonds of a narrow scientific determinism, and to win fresh clearness and assurance for the old values of morality and religion, is seen in *War and the Ideal of Peace* by Henry Rutgers Marshall. It may as well be said at once that this book is an abridged philosophy and that it has no special bearing upon war and peace except in so far as these topics just now furnish the special problems upon which every man's philosophy must test itself. Dr. Marshall's first concern is to oppose the view that "the occasional recurrence of wars must be looked upon as inevitable because man is governed by certain inexorable laws of Nature which make war necessary and even salutary." It would seem that the refutation of this theory should not be difficult. It is an ancient error of those who proclaim adhesion to the laws of nature to narrow unduly the conception of what nature means. Human nature certainly includes the higher as well as the lower. As Professor Külpe remarks: "When the Stoics demanded a life according to nature, they had in mind a rational life founded upon the dominance of the highest spiritual faculties. On the other hand, when Rousseau preached a return to nature, he had reference to the casting off of all the fetters of culture and returning to the child-land of innocent, harmless, and genuine simplicity and happiness." What the extreme militaristic theory is but an incomplete form of naturalism, it is hard to see. But Dr. Marshall is not really content with refutation. His true aim is to

vindicate the value of certain *faiths*, or, to use the term which accords best with his point of view, of certain *ideals*.

Since faiths commonly cannot be justified by reason alone, Dr. Marshall, like others who have thought their way to similar conclusions, is constrained to look for a something deeper than reason. This he finds in a form of the doctrine of panpsychism. Against this doctrine the objection always lies that our mere inability to stop short at any definite point in our attribution of mental life to other beings than ourselves does not necessarily prove, though it powerfully suggests, that our consciousness "is but a special form of a broader psychic characteristic that is pervasive of the Universe." This doctrine, however, though it is not more readily provable than are other theories of reality, has many advantages. If the reader experiences no difficulty in accepting it, he will find in the remainder of Dr. Marshall's book much clear and sound analysis. With this theory as a starting point, it is readily proved that our "creative spontaneity" is not an illusion but that it is effective in the universe. Ideals are seen to have a sovereign efficacy. The pessimist is shown to be "one who more or less deliberately curtails the development of spontaneity"; the optimist "one who more or less deliberately encourages this development." Moral and religious ideas are easily understood as ideals, and moral progress as a conflict between traditional and individual ideals—between the new and the old. "We rise to the highest moral plane when we make permanent for ourselves by voluntary acts—by our own creative spontaneity—moral ideals which stand opposed to already existing ideals, whether these be traditional or self-created." However, since the essence of the matter lies in creative spontaneity, religion must be divested of its mythology and of its un-naturalistic idea of revelation. Hence morality is regarded as primary, religion as derivative. "The essential value of religious expression and of the experience connected with it, lies in the fact that it tends to strengthen within us the voice of conscience, and leads us to acquire the habit of submission to its guidance." Further, an analysis of the idea of *responsibility* shows the vagueness of the underlying conception and demonstrates pretty conclusively that there is no such thing as *irresponsibility*. The general application of all this to war and the ideal of peace is obvious.

But the application to the special problem in hand of the general principles deduced is disappointingly slight and perfunctory. The conclusion that it is our duty to discourage little boys from fighting and playing football seems to require some more special proof than the author vouchsafes. When we read the out-and-out admonition to uphold disarmament even though this may involve serious risks, we may turn back in some perplexity to an earlier passage in which the author warns us that "we must always remember that our own special individualistic ideals of reform are of an experimental nature, and that they may well fail to yield results as effective as those suggested by

the experience of the past as embodied in traditional ideals." Disarmament would be an experiment indeed! Dr. Marshall, after all, is constrained to fall back upon the method of minimizing our danger from foreign aggression. On the whole, he has rather little to say about the important questions of How? and How far? which arise in connection with the effort to realize any great ideal.

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THE HARBOR. By ERNEST POOLE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

*The Harbor* is one of those fictional "life-stories" which may possess a throbbing reality, even though if viewed objectively as novels they may appear to lack strength of plot, rigor of realism, or special accuracy or depth of character drawing. One reads *The Harbor* with feverish interest because the author speaks in terms of imagined experience that are so unconventional and true to nature that they promptly awaken responsive memories and imaginings. It is true that no one person in the story stands out as a particularly well-drawn character; yet all are alive because all do really think and feel and mingle their thought and feeling in the confused human way. It is true that the picture of life presented in the story as a whole has no particular realistic value. Life is viewed with humorous exaggeration at times, at times through a mist of enthusiasm, at times with disillusion: indeed the author views life "every which way," as real people in the course of their experiences do. But this is all real enough subjectively if not objectively. Mr. Poole knows how to inspire as warm a personal and intellectual interest as does, for example, H. G. Wells. He has a similar way of capturing this kind of interest by the unconventional reality of his child-psychology; by his frank dealing with such things as profanity and sex in somewhat close relation with the innocence of childhood—a dealing which one feels to be sincere, clean and real. The story thrills one too with the interest of personal growth and change. It strongly arouses in one the usually dormant feeling that life is not only a passionately absorbing matter to the individual—that there is no real excuse for being bored—but that it is a thing of wide relations in which the larger self must find its adjustments with the world.

Because *The Harbor* has this emotional reality, this intellectual aliveness, it is far more satisfying to read than the majority of contemporary novels. The final test of a story of this type, however, lies in the view of life which it does ultimately present. When we have seen the world through the innocent eyes of childhood and through those of fervent youth, we want to see it at last through the eyes of maturity. We have no right to require completeness of insight, but we properly insist upon a settled point of view. And here is just the fault that one has to find with *The Harbor*: its point of view throughout seems unsettled.